






# AIR WAR COLLEGE

# Research Report

UNITED STATES AIR FORCE GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES:
A STUDY IN TECHNOLOGY, CONCEPTS, AND DETERRENCE

AIR FORCE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION AWARD

RANDALL L. LANNING
LIEUTENANT COLONEL, USAF
1992



Air University United States Air Force Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

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# AIR WAR COLLEGE AIR UNIVERSITY

# "UNITED STATES AIR FORCE GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES: A STUDY IN TECHNOLOGY, CONCEPTS, AND DETERRENCE"

by

Randall L. Lanning Lt Colonel, USAF

A RESEARCH PAPER SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY

IN

FULFILLMENT OF THE CURRICULUM
REQUIREMENT

Advisor: Col James H. Slagle

MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA

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#### **ABSTRACT**

TITLE: "United States Air Force Ground Launched Cruise Missiles:

A Study in Technology, Concepts and Deterrence"

AUTHOR: Randall L. Lanning, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Although generally neglected by historians, USAF Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) have made important contributions to US national security. The paper begins with a brief description of the German V-1, the first true operational GLCM. The balance of the paper traces the lineage of the three tactical, theaterbased GLCMs that served with the US Air Force: The Martin TM-61 "Matador," the Martin TM-76 "Mace," and the General Dynamics BGM-109G "Gryphon." Areas for a comparison and contrast assessment of these systems include the strategic setting, technological description (missile and support equipment), concepts of operation, operational history, phase out, and contributions to deterrence. Appendices, maps, figures, and photographs support the main body. The paper concludes that the first two systems (TM-61 and TM-76) possessed neither the technological sophistication nor sound concept of operations to make them truly effective weapons. deficiencies were rectified in the BGM-109G system. However, with conclusion of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in December, 1987, this class of missiles will probably never be deployed again. Arms control initiatives removed them just when technology and sound operating concepts enabled the GLCM to be a potent deterrent.

#### BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Lieutenant Colonel Randall L. Lanning (M.A., European History, Central Missouri State University) retains a long term interest in military history with an emphasis on weapons technology. This interest was focused on cruise missiles when he was assigned to the Initial Operational Test and Evaluation Team for the BGM-109G Ground Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) in August, 1980. In December, 1982, he was sent to RAF Greenham Common UK as part of the initial cadre of the first operational unit, the 501st Tactical Missile Wing (TMW). While working in the Operations Plans Division, he was instrumental in the development of the first unit-level GLCM war plan and Emergency Actions File, the plan for transitioning the wing from peace to war.

In July, 1985, he was sent to the Directorate of GLCM Operations at Headquarters, United States Air Forces, Europe (USAFE). During his tenure, he was the USAFE GLCM operations point of contact for the beddown of the 303rd TMW at RAF Molesworth UK, the USAFE GLCM war plan, and the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, signed in December, 1987.

In 1988, he was transferred to the Air Staff where he served as the political-military affairs officer for the UK and Scandinavia, and in 1989, became Political-Military Advisor to the Deputy Under Secretary of the Air Force for International Affairs.

Lt Col Lanning has earned the command missile badge, with time in the GLCM and the Minuteman II weapon systems. He is a 1992 graduate of the Air War College.

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# UNITED STATES AIR FORCE GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES: A STUDY IN TECHNOLOGY, CONCEPTS, AND DETERRENCE

## Introduction

Science fiction writers in the early 20th Century must re been infatuated with the idea of unmanned airborne "robot" abers that could fly to distant targets and rain a devastating cload upon helpless populations. The Second World War saw this acept become reality, albeit in rudimentary form. Today, when average citizen thinks about unmanned delivery systems, the clistic missile comes to mind first. But the winged, air breathing aise missile, which preceded ballistic missiles, has made both chnological and deterrent contributions to US security. Even cruise missiles have generally been neglected by historians.

#### Overview

The purpose of this paper is to trace the lineage of three tactical, theater-based Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM):

Martin TM-61 "Matador," the Martin TM-76 "Mace," and the General namics BGM-109G "Gryphon." Following a prologue introduction the first operational GLCM, the German V-1, each system will discussed in terms of the strategic setting, technology, concept operations, operational history, phase out, and contributions deterrence. This study will show that technology and operating ncepts were unable to blend effectively in the two earlier systems. Though the BGM-109G integrated high technology and sound operating ncepts, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty (signed December, 1987) eliminated this class of missiles. Conclusions this work will provide a detailed contrast and comparison.

#### PROLOGUE

## The Legacy of the V-1

The German V-1 was the first "guided" (by gyro autopilot) ile to be used in large numbers, and will be remembered as of the most destructive and unique weapon systems in history. t flown in December, 1942, it was known by several designations 41). Technically, it was known as the Feisler Fi-103, but most common terms were V-1 (V for Vergeltungswaffe or vengeance on), and simply "Buzz Bomb" and "Doodlebug." Regardless of gnation, the V-1 caused far more damage than its well known er, the V-2 ballistic missile.

The V-1 was essentially an unmanned aircraft (17 foot wing and 26 foot length), powered by an Argus 109-014 pulsejet ne. It carried a 1,876 pound (1b) warhead nearly 150 miles speed of 400 miles per hour (mph) (11:46). Since the pulsejet ne needed a minimum speed of 200 mph to engage, launch was cted using a 180 foot ramp and catapult to rapidly gain speed. ddition, 1600 were air launched by HE-111H mother aircraft urther extend the range. Regardless of launch mode, after liles of flight, a small propeller in the nose armed the warhead. andard gyro autopilot was used as guidance, and terminal dive initiated by fuel starvation. Londoners therefore knew that ong as they heard the distinctive pulsejet, they were safe.

Of the nearly 30,000 V-ls produced, Flak Regiment 155 launched 92 against London. A total of 2,419 actually hit the city, ing 6,184 people and injuring another 17,981 (33:60). Later he war, continental targets were also hit, with 7,400 V-ls

ted against Antwerp, Netherlands and Liege, Belgium (33:60).

The British used a four-tiered defense system against the The first line of defense was bombing the launch sites (88 rmed sites by December, 1943) and the factories where the were built. Roughly 67% of those V-ls actually launched downed by the remaining defenses. Allied fighters were used tercept the V-ls, but due to the missile's speed, few were enough to catch it. The British Supermarine "Spitfire" XIV, r "Tempest" V, and DeHavilland "Mosquito" together with the can P-51 "Mustang" were the prime interceptors. The Gloster or" I, Britain's first operational jet, was also used on ntercept missions. Gunfire was often used, but the jet exhaust the V-1 could cause damage to the interceptor. An alternate d was to ease up along side the V-1, slipping a wing under issile's wing, and flipping it over to throw off the gyro ilot. This method, though unconventional, was less dangerous, equired more flying skill. The last two lines of defense antiaircraft guns and barrage balloons. However, neither as effective as bombing and aerial interception.

Following the war, both the US Army Air Corps/Air Force avy experimented with the V-1 under the designations JB-2 Loon" respectively. The Navy saw potential for launching missiles from submarines, and 64 such tests were conducted 3). A total of 1,385 JB-2/"Loons" were delivered, but interests re advanced cruise missiles ("Matador" and "Regulus" ctively) by both Services precluded widescale procurement eployment.

#### e Missile Lessons Learned from the V-1 Program

The V-1 proved that the cruise missile could be a useful, effective weapon. An Allied study after World War II concluded 7-1 production/operating cost-to-inflicted damage ratio in 11 production/operating cost-to-inflicted damage ratio in 12 production/operating cost-to-inflicted damage ratio in 13 production/operating cost-to-inflicted damage ratio in 14 production was 1:3 (33:61). The system had some distinct, inherent 15 production that did not 16 production was a relatively inexpensive weapon that did not 17 production was a true "pilot saver" that could be used in mass. 18 production was a true "pilot saver" that could be launched in all types 18 production was a true pilot saver that could be launched in all types 18 production was difficult 19 production was difficult 1

Like all weapon systems, the V-1 also had some distinct tations. For the most part, it was launched from fixed (and efore vulnerable) launch sites. Unlike the V-2, V-1 ground thers were never mobile, or even movable. Once aloft, the ile flew a predictable flight path with a constant course speed. Knowing this, the Allies could effectively plan rdingly. Finally, the missile had extremely poor accuracy, a severely limited its effectiveness as a precision bombardment on. Its primary impact therefore was one psychological warfare terror). A parallel can be drawn between the V-1 in World II and the Iraqi "Scud-B" during Operation DESERT STORM in regard.

After the war, further work on cruise missiles was curtailed three primary reasons. First, because of Allied defenses ast the V-1, postwar opinion regarding cruise missiles tended

to downplay their effectiveness. It was assessed that these early cruise missiles were too vulnerable to countermeasures. Second, with rapid demobilization after the Second World War, funding was not readily available for in-depth development. The Martin "Matador" discussed in Chapter 2, was one of the few cruise missile systems to escape cancellation during the postwar period.

Finally, with the Air Force's proud tradition of manned aircraft, there was probably an understandable resistance by senior Air Force leaders to deploy a pilotless or remote control weapon. From the earliest days of combat aviation, there has been a justifiable reliance on "the man in the cockpit." While the cruise missile offers the military planner flexibility and many other advantages, its use and cost have been a concern of Air Force leaders because it removes the human element from immediate combat.

In summary, the V-l proved to be a remarkable technical achievement. The balance sheet showed that it was a cost effective weapon for the Germans; it had to be in the later war years. It was advanced technically, economically, and tactically. This assessment set the stage for development of the Air Force's first surface-to-surface guided missile, the Martin TM-61 "Matador."

#### CHAPTER I

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#### THE STRATEGIC SETTING

At the end of the Second World War, the common ties that held the Grand Alliance together dissipated rapidly. The Soviet Union under Josef Stalin remained fearful of foreign invasion ', and came to depend on the Eastern European buffer to ensure their national security. While working with Stalin was acceptable to President Roosevelt during the war years, President Truman viewed Soviet adventures in Eastern Europe as attempts to expand Communism. In 1947, when Communist inroads appeared likely in Greece and Turkey, the President established the Truman Doctrine. This policy stated that the United States would support any non-Communist government attempting to resist subjugation by the Soviets. Relations between the US and USSR were further distanced when the Soviets declined assistance under the Marshal Plan of 1948. The Berlin blockade and formation of NATO in 1948 and 1949 respectively lead to further entrenchment on both sides. When Mao Tse Tung seized power in China in 1949 and North Korea attacked the South in 1950, President Truman's "Containment" strategy was expanded to the global realm. Throughout this period (1945-1953), the United States had a virtual monopoly on atomic weapons, although we did not have many of them. The first Soviet atomic bomb was exploded in 1949. President Truman's strategy of "Containment" restored the balance of power in Europe and set the tone for future relations between the US and Soviet Union.

When President Eisenhower assumed office in 1953, he realized that containing Communism would be a very expensive venture over

the "long haul." Given that the US had clear nuclear superiority, then Secretary of State John Foster Dulles announced the nuclear strategy called "Massive Retaliation" in January, 1954. This policy stated that the United States would retaliate at times and places, and with means of our own choosing. "Massive Retaliation" exemplified "brinkmanship," in that the Soviets would have to carefully calculate how aggressive they could be without bringing a massive nuclear strike down upon themselves. It also took the initiative away from the Soviets, an advantage they had enjoyed under the previous "Containment" strategy. US military response to Soviet aggression would no longer necessarily be limited to the immediate conflict area.

Concurrently, President Eisenhower advocated five major tenants of his "New Look" umbrella defense strategy, which embraced "Massive Retaliation:"

- The United States would never start a war.
- US military forces would be used to deter conflict.
- Modern (nuclear) weapons would be employed.
- Alliances would be an integral part of US defense strategy.
- US national security depended on both military and economic capability.

It is interesting to note that these five concepts have essentially endured to this day. President Eisenhower's last point on economic capability was key. He planned to use overwhelming US nuclear superiority as a less expensive alternative deterrent to conventional forces. These non-nuclear forces would continue to play a "tripwire" role overseas to signal Soviet aggression.

Clearly, nuclear superiority from 1953 to 1961 allowed "Massive Retaliation" to succeed. Even so, "Flexible Retaliation" may have been a more appropriate term, because there were few scenarios (attack on the US or Western Europe) where the US would have massively retaliated. Although the US was comfortably secure in its nuclear superiority during this period, the launch of the world's first artificial satellite, Sputnik, by the Soviets in October, 1957, contributed to fears of a possible missile and bomber gap. We know now this was only a perceived threat.

By 1954, the Korean War was over and the Soviets had tested their first thermonuclear bomb. Although the surface-to-surface missile (SSM) was not used in Korea, great interest remained in targeting Soviet and Chinese military forces, rather than cities (counterforce rather than countervalue targeting). Defense planners recommended development of an entire family of missiles to support these objectives in the immediate postwar period. Examples include the Army's "Redstone", the Navy's "Regulus I and II, "and the Air Force's "Snark" and "Matador" (4:27). These missiles together with a modern bomber force offered diverse capabilities for US planners against enemy theater forces, as well as their industrial bases. Even so, the missile had not been fully accepted into strategic force planning due to the new technology involved and the varied opinions of V-l effectiveness during the Second World War.

#### CHAPTER II

1

#### THE MARTIN TM-61 "MATADOR"

#### Development

Although funds were limited after World War Two, the success achieved by the Germans with their V-l spurred similar cruise missile development in the United States. As noted above, the American versions of the V-l (JB-2 and "Loon") lead directly to development of the first US-designed cruise missiles, the Navy's "Regulus I" and the Air Force's "Matador." The Army was essentially uninvolved with these types of programs due to a ruling issued by Secretary of Defense Charles F. Wilson on 26 Nov 56. His guidance stated that Army weapons used for tactical support would be limited to a range of 200 miles (23:112).

In 1946, the Glenn L. Martin Company was awarded \$1.8 million to begin development on what was then known as the SSM (presumably for surface-to-surface missile) (7:1850). With this contract, the Air Force expressed a need for unmanned "pilotless bombers" to supplement conventional aircraft. Planners saw cruise missiles as an effective means to deliver a heavy offensive load at reasonable cost, since the vehicle could be built for a one way trip, and avoid designs that needed to accommodate landing stress (17:205). The Air Force requirement called for a "pilotless bomber" with a range between 175 and 200 miles at speeds in the 600 miles per hour (mph) range (33:108). The missile was to be ground launched, although air delivery was studied. The first XSSM flight occurred on 19 Jan 49. Concurrently with 10 dynamically similar models, Martin built 15 XSSM experimental missiles from readily available

components, modified as necessary to get a missile into the air as quickly as possible. The aerodynamic shape of the missile was, in fact, similar to that of the Martin XB-51, a three-engined, two-place bomber that never entered production (8:300). Testing of these XSSM's continued at Holloman AFB, New Mexico, throughout 1949 and 1950. During design and test flights, the XSSM program survived several defense cuts, until the outbreak of the Korean conflict in June, 1950. Experiences during the Korean conflict emphasized the need for a tactical cruise missile for bombardment at medium and long ranges, and SSM development proceeded with top priority. During this time, another key element that made the SSM attractive to the Air Force was Martin's zero-length launcher (ZEL). The ZEL allowed launch from a towed trailer using a rocket assisted take off (RATO) booster, eliminating the need for the long catapult rails associated with ground launch of the V-1. This ZEL, sustainer engine, and RATO combination accelerated the SSM from 0 to 200 mph in less than two seconds, allowing for takeoff in a very short distance (14:5).

The SSM evolved into the B-61 (the "B" designation retained due to its role as a pilotless bomber) to become the first operational US surface-to-surface missile, with deployments beginning in March, 1954 in Germany. It was the first cruise missile since the V-1 to enter service.

#### Technical Description

#### Designations

The "Matador" went through several designations throughout its operational life. As noted above, it was known as the XSSM,

and then the SSM during testing. Upon initial deployment, it was known as the B-61 until June, 1955 when it was redesignated TM-61 (Tactical Missile). The TM-61 was developed in three versions, models A, B, and C. The TM-61A and C remained "Matador" and are discussed below in this chapter. The TM-61B was such a dramatic departure from the TM-61A, that it was given an entirely new designation, the TM-76 "Mace," discussed in the next chapter. In 1963, the "Matador" was again redesignated as MGM-1, though by that time it was completely phased out of operational service.

#### The TM-61A Missile

Appendix A contains the specification for the TM-61 missile. Figure and Photograph 1 provide illustrations. The SSM closely resembled the TM-61; the major difference was in wing location. The SSM had a mid-body wing, while the TM-61 featured a shouldermounted wing.

The TM-61 was in the truest sense of the word a pilotless airplane. Composed of all-metal sandwich construction, its airframe was designed for one flight, and therefore more lightly stressed than a manned aircraft. The inner layer was light alloy with a honeycomb metal foil filler under a thick metal outer skin, bonded together with a thermo-setting resin (8:302). The wings, fin, and tailplane were solid except for control runs and a fluxgate compass in the port wingtip.

The TM-61 series had the capability to carry either a conventional or nuclear warhead. The nuclear warhead used was the Mark 5, America's first lightweight nuclear weapon. fissionable material was kept separate from the weapon in a capsule, and inserted before launch. Providing a yield of 40 to 50 kilotons, its nuclear punch was not a significant improvement over the bombs dropped on Japan at the close of World War II (10:82). An airburst weapon only, it was designed for high altitude internal carriage, and most effective against soft targets. Other carriers of this weapon included the B-29, B-36, B-45, B-47, B-50, B-52, and "Regulus I" cruise missile.

The sustainer powerplant was the Allison J-33 A-37 centrifugal turbojet engine, the same used for both the P-80 and T-33. Although rather unspectacular in performance, it was very reliable. This was a "short life" version of the engine, designed for only 10 hours of operation (33:109).

The RATO booster weighed 2000 lbs, 700 of which was picric nitrate solid rocket fuel. Upon ignition, the RATO unit produced up to 57,000 lbs of thrust for 2.3 seconds, rapidly accelerating the missile to a speed of 200 mph (8:303). The booster was attached only by a screw jack on the launcher and forward facing open hooks on the missile. It was held in place by thrust, and when the booster burnt out, it simply fell off.

Upon launch, the ground controller had to take control of the missile immediately after booster separation. At this time, the missile automatically transitioned to level flight at booster separation. Its flight path included four phases: launch, climb, cruise, and terminal dive to burst altitude (28:1), under continual ground radio control.

The guidance used in the TM-61A employed technology derived from World War II and Korea all weather bombing systems used to

direct fighter-bomber strikes on enemy targets at night or in overcast conditions. It was a manually controlled ground radio command guidance system known as MARC (Manual Airborne Radio Control). It used an AN/MSQ-1 mobile ground radar set and an AN/APW-11A airborne radar assembly (12:129). This system was line-of-sight only, and required ground based radio operators to be posted on remote mountain tops between the missile launch point and the target. For German-based units, the 60lst Tactical Control Wing performed this function. These operators were really remote pilots, who acquired the TM-61A immediately after launch and guided it to the assigned target. Remote commands included course changes, warhead arming, and terminal dive. These commands were manually "beeped" to the autopilot and warhead using the APW-11 transponder in the missile. Because this guidance was line-of-sight, it had inherent drawbacks. It limited the range to approximately 200 miles, even though the fuel capacity permitted a longer flight (up to 650 miles). It also had an increased vulnerability to air interception and was subject to jamming. The ground radio direction sites were themselves vulnerable to attack and destruction (14:6). Figure 2 illustrates the MARC concept.

## The TM-61C Missile

For all practical purposes, the TM-61A and TM-61C were externally identical. Internally, the only major difference was the guidance system used. As noted above, the MARC system had limitations. These were partially rectified by the SHANICLE (Short Range Navigation Vehicle) system introduced in the TM-61C. This

stem, similar to LORAN, employed four ground based transmitters beacons to create a hyperbolic grid - two (master and slave) ntrolling the range, and two for azimuth - along which the missile uld fly (10:145). A hyperbolic grid system involves the creation a grid pattern of radio waves by the four radio transmitters, ch located in a different location. Unlike radar which is limited line-of-site, a radio grid may be broadcast for several hundred .les. The missile could be programmed in advance to follow a ertain sequence of augmented and diminished radio impulses directly > the target without the necessity for manual control by a human perator, as required by MSQ (30:1-1-18). Figure 3 illustrates is concept. SHANICLE in the TM-61C afforded both greater range nd less vulnerability to jamming. The line-of-sight requirement as gone, and controllers could quide more than one missile at time. The TM-61C could be guided by either the SHANICLE or ARC systems, and with the latter, achieved a true all weather apability (20:108).

As the most advanced version of the "Matador," the TM-61C is assessed to have the following reliability figures (15:1):

nunch: 95%, In Flight: 75%, Overall: 71%, Circular Error Probable CEP): 2700 feet. CEP is the radius of a circle, with the target center, in which at least 50% of warheads launched will impact.

A total of 28 vehicles of various types were required to apport the TM-61 system (33:112). Equipment included the launcher, cansporter, special purpose check out and targeting equipment, smote guidance and tracking equipment, and ground handling and

:vicing equipment (28:1).

The ZEL (Photograph 2) was the most important piece of port equipment. This launcher allowed the TM-61 to become borne without any takeoff run. It held the missile at three into and elevated it to 17 degrees in preparation for launch. carried its own motor generator, blower, hydraulic pump, and ig racks, and was pulled by a standard Army 5 ton prime mover. preparation for launch, it was steadied by three hydraulic ks. Although the concept of operations called for the use a separate transporter (which also served as assembly rig), as ZEL could be used as a transporter in an emergency (34:15). Is need for a separate transporter and launcher highlighted potential benefit of combining the two. A Coles 20 ton, 39 of mobile crane was used to move missile components from the ansporter to the launcher (34:15).

Of note, the TM-61 was the first Air Force weapons system have its own supply depot deployed overseas. This eventually came a detachment of the Warner Robins Air Materiel Area at thurg AB, using contracted civilian workers (26:20).

#### Concept of Operations

Although described as a mobile missile system, the TM-61 , be better described as "movable" due to the extensive amount support equipment required. Even so, all equipment needed : launching the TM-61 was on wheels and operations could be iducted from an area with pierced steel planking in "a corner a farmer's field" (5:21). Therefore perhaps the the best term describe "Matador's" concept of operations is "extremely limited

persal."

Prior to dispersal, TM-61 components were tested and the ine was run up. Missile components were stored on their nsporters fully fueled and combat ready except for the nose e, wings, and RATO unit (8:303).

In advanced states of readiness, the missile and its support ts would deploy to the field. Each flight would deploy five es equidistant from the main base and each other (12:152). oute, the missile was carried in four parts: fuselage, wings, head, and booster (10:145). Upon arrival at the launch site, took ten men 90 minutes to prepare the missile for takeoff. reakdown of these tasks may be found at Appendix B. Photographs and 4 illustrate this work in progress.

Each TM-61 squadron had three flights. There were 100 icles per squadron, fifty of which were powered. Therefore t of the 169 men assigned were drivers of some sort. Three s vans accompanied the convoy, providing rations for up to days of dispersed operations. Each squadron had six ZEL nchers, and was capable of launching 20 missiles in a 9 hour (12:31). By 1958, this number had increased to eight launchers squadron, with six on nuclear alert in each squadron (20:107).

For testing and training, the missiles were never fired m their operational sites, but countdowns were practiced regularly include assembly, testing, and engine start. The RATO unit never fired. However, European theater operational test launches e conducted from an Air Force site 17 miles east of Wheelus Libya, which extended far into the Libyan Desert.

To give ground controllers practice at operational units, cially instrumented T-33s would overfly the site at time of ulated launch and respond to visual and audio commands generated the MARC or SHANICLE controllers on the ground (8:301). These craft flew daily training schedules, sometimes performing two three missile runs per flight.

# Operational History

The TM·61 entered service in 1951 as the first operational .ded missile in the Air Force inventory (27:9). Subsequent rational deployments to both Europe and the Pacific are summarized Appendix C, Organizational Lineage.

#### Phase Out

Despite improvements with the SHANICLE guidance system, rigation and accuracy problems with the TM-61 persisted, never ing completely solved. Phase out of the TM-61A was complete 1957, and the TM-61C was gone by 1962. The improved TM-61B, in development, was to replace both systems as the TM-76A.

#### Contributions to Deterrence

The TM-61 gave the United States Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) remendously enhanced nuclear capability. With this missile, AFE could strike enemy targets that were too heavily defended manned aircraft in all types of weather, day or night.

The remained are all types of weather, were too heavily defended that the manned aircraft in all types of weather, day or night.

The remained are all types of weather, were all types of weather, we really only movable), was not restricted to airfields. Except for the SM-62 "Snark," remained the longest range missile in the Air Force inventory, and replaced by "Mace." According to the 701st Tactical Missile

(TMW) TM-61C Operations Handbook, the mission of these missiles to:

id in the establishment of air superiority.

perate when weather conditions restrict manned aircraft.

perate when maximum effort with reduced reaction time is ired.

estroy heavily defended targets which could result in prohibitive es by manned aircraft (30:1-1-4).

The system's technology could also be applied to new missiles r development. As a result of its introduction, the Air Force its lead in missile handling and guidance expertise.

Major General Robert M. Lee, Commander of 12th Air Force, arized "Matador's" contribution to deterrence well: "The tion of these units will enable us to launch attacks on any of target in all types of weather" (5:21).

#### CHAPTER III

#### THE MARTIN TM-76 "MACE"

#### Technical Description

## Designations

As noted in the previous chapter, the "Mace" originally began as an advanced version of the "Matador," the TM-61B. Due to extended development, the TM-61B was not deployed as such, but was redesignated TM-76A or "Mace A." A second variant of "Mace" was the TM-76B. Both are discussed below. By the end of 1963, designations for the TM-76A and B were changed to MGM-13B and CGM-13C respectively. In March, 1964 designations were again changed to MGM-13A ("Mace A") and CGM-13B ("Mace B"). Drone versions of "Mace A" were known as MQM-13A (20:107). To summarize, the following designations applied:

- "Mace A" = TM-61B = TM-76A = MGM-13B = MGM-13A = MQM-13A
- "Mace B" = TM-76B = CGM-13C = CGM-13B

On a humorous note, the original nickname for the missile was to be "Mighty Mace," but it was so often misq.oted as "Mickey Mouse" that the name was shorted simply to "Mace" (14:5).

#### The TM-76A Missile

The TM-76A was the third USAF GLCM to enter service, following the TM-61 "Matador" and SM-62 "Snark" (an intercontintal cruise missile beyond the scope of this paper). Development of the TM-61B ended in 1957, when it was determined there were enough differences (from the TM-61A) to warrant a completely new designation (10:148). With its "Matador" lineage, the TM-76 could trace its ancestry back to the V-1. The TM-76 was virtually identical to the TM-61

from the mid-fuselage back. Although six feet shorter than those on "Matador," the wings were also very similar, incorporating the same "finger fan" spoilers on the upper surface (14:6). However, rather than remaining completely detached, the TM-76 wings could be folded along the fuselage sides, much like that of a World War Two carrier aircraft.

The main difference between the two missiles was the forward fuselage area, 5 feet longer in "Mace." In this section, additional fuel could be carried to accommodate longer flights and lower altitudes. A more powerful warhead was carried: the Mark 28 fusion bomb. With a yield in the high kiloton and low megaton range, this warhead packed 40 times the nuclear punch of the Mark 5 in "Matador" (10:148). This same warhead could also be carried by "Hound Dog," the B-47, B-52, B-66, and F-105.

The biggest difference between the TM-76 and the earlier TM-61 was the guidance system. "Mace A" used a system called ATRAN (Automatic Terrain Recognition and Navigation). It incorporated a large DPS-1 radar dish in the nose that would search for key topographical and geographical landmarks along its preprogrammed flight path. ATRAN's memory stored this information on 35 millimeter film strips in the missile. At two nautical mile intervals, ATRAN would search the terrain below for key landmarks and compare readings with the filmstrips stored in the guidance set. These intervals were known as "lock boxes," and overlapped to an extent, similar to the "trip-tic" concept used by The American Automobile Association for long journeys. This system could be used to program the missile to avoid known defensive

areas, take evasive maneuvers, and change flight altitudes (10:149). After launch, it was completely independent, and could not be recalled. Although a tremendous advance over the TM-61C SHANICLE system, ATRAN had significant drawbacks. It limited the missile's range, as it could fly farther than the map matching system could be programmed. ATRAN proved to be highly susceptible to jamming and could not be used over water. Even so, since ATRAN did not require a preplanned, firm launch point, it could be fired from various locations, and therefore a mobile concept of operations for "Mace A" was adopted. This however traded prelaunch survivability for target accuracy.

The new TM-76A nose section was completed with the addition of an autopilot, avionics cooling equipment, and a radar altimeter. The changes collectively produced a missile with greater range, firepower, and accuracy than the earlier TM-61. However, the cost per missile was much higher: \$250,000 for "Mace" compared to \$60,000 for "Matador" (27:111).

The booster and sustainer engine were also more powerful to accommodate "Mace A's" increased weight. See Appendix D for complete specifications and Figure 4 and Photograph 5 for illustrations. The Allison J-33A-4-1 produced 5,200 pounds of thrust and the booster produced 97,000 pounds of thrust. This \$15,000 short life engine, also used in the P-80, T-33, and F-84, allowed standard jet aircraft mechanics to work on "Mace." A Headquarters, Tactical Air Command spokesman was quoted as saying, "The Martin Mace is the least complex missile in our inventory today" (7:1814).

# The TM-76B Missile

As noted above, although the ATRAN guidance system was an improvement over that of the TM-61, it retained inherent limitations. Development of the "Mace B" was focused on an improved, inertial only guidance system. Inertial guidance is a form of "memory navigation." The geographic position of both the launch point and the target must be known and set into the system prior to launch. The missile then "knows" the exact distance to be traveled. Once launched, the missile is aware of exactly how far it has traveled. It then subtracts this distance from the "remembered" total distance and knows precisely how far it is to the target. This process is constantly repeated until the distance to the target is zero at which point the TM-76B is put into a dive or simply explodes in an airburst. Although externally identical to "Mace A," the TM-76B replaced ATRAN with the self contained AChiever inertial guidance system produced by the AC Sparkplug Company. This improvement afforded greater range for the missile (twice that of "Mace A") and allowed for overwater flights. This change also affected both its deployment location and concept of operations. Since "Mace B" was inertial guidance only, it required a fixed launch point, eliminating mobility. It also was the logical candidate for Pacific deployment due to the large amounts of water and distances involved in theater. Figure 5 depicts "Mace B."

#### Support Equipment

Only "Mace A" had unique support equipment, since it was the only version to be used in a mobile configuration. Goodyear

Aircraft designed its complete ground support equipment set.

This standardization drastically reduced the number of vehicles required for launch down to three (33:112).

all three vehicles (launcher and two support vehicles)
used the Military Model One (MM-1) "Teracruzer" built by the Four
Wheel Drive Corporation of Clintonville, Wisconsin. Figure and
Photograph 6 illustrate this vehicle. It was designed soley for
the "Mace A" system, and the Air Force bought 189 of them at a
cost of \$39,366 each. All were delivered by mid-1959. This prime
mover was 30 feet long and 9½ feet tall, over and above the 18
foot ground clearance needed to accomodate the tires. The engine
was an eight cylinder Continental engine, offering a speed of
up to 25 mph. It used unique "Tera" or "Pillow" tires that were
each 3½ feet high and wide. With low tire pressure, they offered
excellent mobility. Since these tires could be inflated or deflated
using the engine's compressor, leaks were tolerated and flats
were infrequent (14:13).

The MM-1 was essentially a mini-flatbed truck designed to carry various equipment packs used for ordinance, assembly and checkout, and launch (16:415). These packages included the Transporter-Launcher (Translauncher), crane, storage pack, fuel pack, nose and booster pack, fifth wheel, test pack, van pack, and power pack (25:34). Figure 6 shows the configuration of the main vehicle: MM-1 with fuel and power packs, fifth wheel, and Translauncher.

The Translauncher used four "Tera Tires" that were detached prior to launch. This trailer is also used as a platform for

assembly, servicing and checkout.

## Concept of Operations

# "Mace A" Dispersal

Using the support equipment above, the TM-76A was officially classed as mobile, but the expense of truly mobile operations was prohibitive, so the term "movable" was considered more appropriate, just as it was for the TM-61 series (20:108). advanced states of readiness, the TM-76A was transported to dispersed locations carried on the Translauncher with its wings folded. Missiles were deployed individually to remote locations where they were assembled, checked out and launched by a nine man crew. Upon arrival, only the booster and nose/warhead section needed to be attached and the wings unfolded, quite a change from the procedures for the TM-61 described in Appendix B. The missile also had wide weather parameters for firing: up to a 50 mph headwind, 25 mph tail or side wind, temperatures from -50 to 103 degrees Fahrenheit, and less than 5000 feet above sea level (23:164). Even though streamlined prelaunch setup procedures and wide launch parameters afforded a much faster attack response, a "hitch free" countdown took 43 minutes, much too long for satisfactory prelaunch survivability (10:148). In addition, dispersal movements were severely hampered by the fragile nature of the missile's vacuum tubes, the narrow German road system, and Weapons System Safety Rule restrictions. Consequently, the TM-76A retained this dispersal concept of operations for only about 18 months after fielding (14:7).

Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces observers noted the following dditional limitations of "Mace A" dispersal (23:120):

A strong possibility that the dispersed launch sites were already nown to the enemy, and could be taken out before missile launch.

Camouflage would not be very useful due to the smoke, dust, and noise caused by engine run up and booster ignition.

Sites could be detected by enemy photo reconnaissance.

Electronic radiation generated from the equipment could lead to discovery.

#### 'Mace A" Rapid Fire Multiple Launch (RFML)

After dispersal was abandoned as a viable concept for "Mace 1" units, the RFML concept was adopted in October, 1961. Each affected tactical missile group (TMG) established three launch complexes on the main operating base in fixed, unhardened locations. As illustrated in Photograph 7, each of these complexes had two launch sites with four missiles per flight. Launch control was affected from a 10 X 18 foot hardened block house at each site. The alert crew consisted of one officer and three enlisted men (24:20). Four of these missiles were continually elevated, on alert and were to be launched within 12 minutes. Those remaining would be fired every 90 seconds thereafter (31:2). In summary, each TMG had 36 TM-76As, with 12 in maintenance and the remaining 24 on alert.

This concept was also flawed in that the unprotected missiles were extremely vulnerable to attack. Even though they remained on the base, and could launched rapidly, their positions were known and had no protection from direct attack.

#### "Mace B" Hardened Shelters

The TM-76B with inertial guidance used the most effective concept of operations, hardened shelters, at both Bitburg in Germany and on Okinawa in the Pacific. These shelters were built to withstand conventional attacks only, and deemed the best protection for these missiles. At Bitburg for example there were two "Mace B" sites. Each site had two hardened complexes with four launchers each, for a total of 16 missiles on Quick Reaction Alert (QRA). The complexes were completely self sustaining, providing their own power, water, and sewage. A seven man launch crew worked behind two five ton blast doors (26:20). Photograph 8 depicts a "Mace B" launch from a hardened site.

#### Operational History

Appendix C contains the operational history of the "Mace A and B" in Europe, and the "Mace B" in Japan (Okinawa). As a footnote to Appendix C, the decision to base nuclear weapons in Japan (Okinawa) was a calculated risk that could have caused international political repercussions. However, no serious problems developed (18:18).

#### Phase Out

In 1965, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara put the Army's "Pershing I" on QRA, believing it could replace "Mace" due to a dramatically reduced launch time. It appears range was not considered, given "Pershing's" range was only half that of "Mace A" and only a quarter of "Mace B" (10:149).

The last "Mace Bs" left Bitburg AB by Fall of 1969, leaving only the 498 TMG on Okinawa. They were retired in 1971 in

preparation for Japan retaking custody of the island on 15 May, 1972.

### The "Mace A" Drone Program

The "Mace A" did soldier on in a drone program administered by the Tactical Air Warfare Center (TAWC) at Eglin AFB, Florida.

The TM-76A proved to be a realistic target for testing Air Force weapons. Aircraft from the 4756 Air Defense Wing at Tyndall AFB and the 33rd Tactical Fighter Wing at Eglin AFB used the old missiles for gun and missile target practice. In one incident, F-4s failed to down a "Mace A" using both 20 millimeter cannon gunfire and "Sidewinder" missiles, despite several direct hits. The missile continued south and actually overflew Cuba, crashing only when out of fuel.

Major General Andrew J. Evans Jr., Commander of TAWC at the time, said, "The realistic conditions which we can create through the use of of these "Mace" drones have enabled us to test and deploy many new air-to-air weapons systems to Southeast Asia. The knowledge we gain through these tests enables us to accurately predict how the weapons and tactics will perform under combat conditions (26:22).

#### Contributions To Deterrence

"Mace" was built to compliment tactical fighter bombers in counter air and air interdiction roles. With it, the Air Force was given a much improved all weather, day or night interdiction capability. It remained the only medium range tactical missile in the Air Force inventory. After launch, the system had a high probability of penetration, capable of flying under radar defenses

in any conditions. As the least complicated missile in the Air Force inventory, it was relatively inexpensive, and was most reliable. (16:414-415). In a 1960 Budget Hearing Statement prepared by Martin, "Mace" was described as a weapon system that "is inexpensive, it is available, it is versatile, and it is capable of fulfilling a requirement for a quick reacting, all-weather strike weapons system in both the Pacific and NATO areas."

1

In the Pacific, "Mace B" was deployed to act as a deterrent force to be used prior to the arrival of TAC's Composite Air Striking Force. It was an effective replacement for the "Matador," whose range was too short (13:214). With "Mace B," key Chinese industrial complexes such as Chunking, Hankow, Shanghi, and Beijing could be targeted. There was no other significant force in theater that offered this capability (18:18).

## An End For Cruise Missiles?

In March, 1969, <u>The Airman</u> called "Mace" the "last surface -to-surface nonballistic missile in the Air Force inventory" (26:19). Throughout the lifetime of the TM-61/TM-76 systems, missile guidance proved to be the major technological stumbling block. Both the guidance and the manpower intensive nature of these systems impacted the concepts of operation. Some of the more notable deficiencies in these missiles included (33:112):

- Generally poor design features.
- Inadequate testing.
- Poor inflight reliability (survivability) and CEP.
- Questionable control over long distances.
- Nonstandardized development procedures (adhoc adaptations).

- · Unacceptable operational performance, needing many modifications.
- · Limited mobility.

In general, "Mace" and "Matador" could not offer the desired apabilities of mobility, high speed, and extreme accuracy. These characteristics ran counter to missiles of this type, and the echnology was not available to make them a reality. With the deep of ballistic missiles, many believed GLCMs were obsolete. In fact, retirement of these systems signaled only the end of our first major historical period of cruise missiles.

# CHAPTER IV

# AN INTERLUDE WITHOUT GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILES

"Mace" was finally retired from operational service by

71. The next generation of GLCM would reach initial operational pability in December of 1983, leaving just over a decade without fielded missile in this class. The international environment d technological advances during this interim period merit brief amination to serve as a transition from early cruise missiles the current generation.

# The Strategic Setting

Both "Mace" and "Matador" served in their heyday during esident Eisenhower's era of "Massive Retaliation," discussed Chapter I. "Mace" soldiered on throughout the 1960's during change in our defense strategy known as "Flexible Response," vocated by Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara and supported both Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Military spending was focused on conventional forces and an ability to combat Communist gression at all levels of conflict, with new attention towards e Third World. The Vietnam War was a direct outgrowth of this rategy. Nuclear forces remained important during this period, t from 1965 onward, the Soviets reached rough nuclear parity th the US.

When President Nixon assumed office in 1969, his top priority s to withdraw with honor from Vietnam. He did this through e Nixon Doctrine's three pillars, which stated the following:

The US will honor our existing treaty commitments.

The US will retain a "nuclear shield" for self protection and at of selected allies.

The US will assist other nations in lower forms of aggression, t the primary burden for defense will rest with the nation directly fected.

Nuclear strategy reflected a US-Soviet parity in "Realistic terrence," where superiority was no longer the goal. The Nixon ministration was also responsible for opening the door to China, tente with the Soviets, and arms control agreements such as LT I, concluded in 1973. After President Nixon's resignation, esident Ford generally retained these policies.

In the aftermath of Watergate, President Carter assumed fice in 1977 on a moral and human rights platform. His nuclear rategy, known as the "Counterveiling Strategy" reflected nuclear fficiency. The premise was a response "in kind," to a Soviet clear attack, but not necessarily at the same levels. It also ployed a counterforce, or military, targeting policy.

The signals sent by President Carter and his nuclear policies re mixed in Europe. Some felt his perceived indecisiveness s causing a nuclear imbalance in Europe, particularly with ployment of the Soviet SS-20 Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile. response, President Carter agreed to field 572 new nuclear ssiles (464 GLCMs and 108 "Pershing II") in Europe as part of "dual track" decision. This decision was based on the condition at the deployment was to be made concurrently with arms control itiatives to withdraw or eliminate these missiles. Massive tinuclear protests were also a factor in seeking an arms control

eement. NATO unanimously approved this dual track decision December, 1979 (33:201). These missiles were not an increase the number of weapons, just modernization of the existing force; er systems would be retired (10:151). In a January, 1979 meeting, e nations agreed to host the missiles: The United Kingdom (first e), Italy (first to agree to host), Germany, Belgium, and the herlands. However, it must be remembered that Germany was eady host to US Army "Pershing I" missiles, and for political sons, preferred that another continental NATO ally agree first host cruise missiles. Although Italy did volunteer first, ir basing selection was Comiso, on the island of Sicily (off continent). In any event, GLCM was attractive to the NATO ies as it offered a highly survivable, cost effective nuclear tem that could free up dual capable aircraft for conventional sions. For the US, the deployment offered significant political antages for the US in that it was highly visible and demonstrated ar resolve and commitment (33:201-202).

Although the US Army was to operate the "Pershing II,"

y had little or no interest in GLCM due to manpower required

:204). So, in the tradition of "Mace/Matador" and Secretary

son's 1956 ruling on the 200 mile range limit for Army support

pons, the Air Force became operators for the GLCM.

President Carter's confidence in emerging cruise missile hnology was reflected in his decision to arm the existing 2 force with Air Launched Cruise Missiles (ALCM) rather than loy the B-lA (which he canceled). The administration based s decision on both cost savings and military effectiveness

(33:177). Cruise missile technology had made great strides since "Mace," and it is important to understand the most important improvements before discussing the BGM-109G in detail.

# Technological Improvements

From a technological standpoint, "Matador" and "Mace" will be remembered as large, unreliable, and generally inaccurate.

After their development, there were several new cruise missile designs studied, but only three noteworthy examples were actually deployed. Two were air launched: the AGM-28 "Hound Dog" nuclear standoff missile and the GAM-72 "Quail" decoy missile. The third was a surface-to-air "pilotless interceptor," the CIM-10 "Bomarc".

Improvements that made the BGM-109G, the entire "Tomahawk" family, and Boeing AGM-86 ALCM possible fall into four categories:

Guidance

The McDonnell Douglas Aircraft Company developed a system known as Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM), a highly advanced version of the ATRAN system associated with "Mace A." TERCOM employs a series of map cells (or squares) that range from 3200 feet per side on the larger maps, down to 100 feet per side on the smallest maps. Like ATRAN, TERCOM compares overflown terrain with the maps stored in memory and makes course adjustments accordingly (33:136). Since TERCOM missions are planned in advance, this system can also be used to avoid known defenses. The missile's flight path is governed primarily by inertial guidance with periodic TERCOM updates. This system also improved post launch survivability by affording the capability to fly at extremely low altitudes. As the missile approaches its target, the maps become progressively

smaller. Landfall maps are the largest, midcourse are the medium sized maps, and terminal area maps are the smallest. Accuracy was dramatically improved due to the very narrow error parameters associated with the small terminal area TERCOM maps.

# Engine

Both the AGM-86 and BGM-109 series use the Williams

International F-107 turbofan engine. This fuel efficient, high
performance sustainer powerplant can achieve high subsonic speeds
and has proven highly reliable. The fuel used was also an
improvement to give the missile required range.

# Minaturization

The technical ability to substantially reduce the size of the guidance set, warhead, and engine increases post launch survivability. The small overall size of modern cruise missiles presents an extremely small radar cross section to the enemy.

# Construction and Materials

New manufacturing processes and materials reduced both weight and production costs, but neither was as prominent an improvement as the others discussed above.

### CHAPTER V

### THE GENERAL DYNAMICS BGM-109G "GRYPHON"

# Technical Description

# The Missile

The BGM-109G (Boosted Guided Missile) externally resembles the General Dynamics family of "Tomahawk" cruise missiles. Figure 7 illustrates the missile with the wings and four tail fins fully extended. In storage, the main wings are retracted inside the fuselage and the tail fins are folded over. The missile in this configuration with solid rocket booster attached is placed in a canister for transport and protection. The missile in its canister is known as an All-Up-Round (AUR). The AUR is loaded or the Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL) to serve as a launch tube for the missile.

Internally, the missile is powered by the Williams

International F-107-WR-102 turbofan engine, producing 600 pounds
of thrust (10:150). The guidance system is provided by McDonnell

Douglas, and consists of inertial guidance and updates using the

TERCOM system described in the previous chapter. The warhead

used is the W-84, unique to this weapon system. Unclassified

sources indicate a yield of 80 kilotons (10:150). See Appendix

E for full missile specifications.

Launch of the BGM-109G could be effected in any direction.

Upon booster ignition, the missile burst through the forward end of the AUR, which was made of material resembling thick aluminum foil. Shortly after takeoff, the tail fins deploy first to provide roll stability, followed several seconds later by the main wings.

During the transition from boost phase to cruise flight, the booster burns out and drops off as the sustainer engine engages. The missile flies first to the Initial Timing Control Point (ITCP). This is the point in airspace where the mission actually begins. To get to its target, the missile uses its inertial guidance and TERCOM. As noted in Chapter IV, TERCOM uses three types of "maps," landfall, enroute, and terminal area. Each is progressively smaller, so navigation margins are reduced as the missile nears its target. Support Equipment: The Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL)

The TEL is the first of two units required to launch the BGM-109G. It is 56 feet long and 8 feet wide, with a weight of 80,000 pounds (10:151). Each TEL carries four AURs in a strongback assembly that elevates to 45 degrees in preparation for launch. As the strongback assembly elevates, protective covers for the launch tubes at the rear begin to open. When the strongback is fully elevated, these covers are fully open.

# Support Equipment: The Launch Control Center (LCC)

The LCC is the second unit required for launch of the BGM-109G. The main shelter houses the two launch control officers and provides protection from small arms fire. It also contains the weapons control system and High, Very High, and Ultra High Frequency radios. Entry into the LCC is through an armored door on the right side of the shelter, but an escape hatch in the floor is also provided. The environmental control system is located in an aft equipment box that also provides for chemical, biological and radioactive protection.

# Support Equipment: TEL and LCC Common Features

The TEL and LCC had several features in common. The trailer used was standard Government Furnished Equipment. The same four-wheeled frame was used for both units. The forward equipment box, though not identical, was similar for both in that it housed an MEP-404A turbine generator for power. Both the TEL and LCC used the same prime mover - the eight-wheel drive M.A.N. (Maschinenfabrik Augsburg-Nuremburg) tractor made in West Germany. This same prime mover was also used for the Army's "Pershing II" missile system. Finally, TELs and LCCs were connected for command and control by finger-thin fiber optic cables. Figure 8 shows both the TEL and LCC.

# Concept of Operations

The basic operating unit for the BGM-109G was the flight. Each flight consisted of four TELs and two LCCs. Since each TEL carried four missiles (in AUR configuration), one flight could launch 16 missiles. Although only one LCC was required for launch, a second was provided for redundancy. The flights operated in two modes, on the main operating base and dispersed.

# Main Operating Base

Day to day during peacetime, BGM-109G flights were stored in Ready Storage Shelters (RSS), one flight per shelter. These shelters were located in a secure GLCM Alert and Maintenance Area (GAMA). The RSS was little more than a heavily protected garage for six vehicles (two LCCs and four TELs), with drawbridge type doors that opened at each end. One RSS in the GAMA had built in living quarters for a launch crew to perform Quick Reaction

Alert (QRA). The wing alternate command post was located adjacent to the QRA crew area to take advantage of the hardened protection against conventional attack afforded by this facility. If needed, the QRA crew had the capability to launch their missiles from the GAMA by pulling the TELs out of the shelters for execution. Commercial power was used in lieu of the MEP-404 generators on the vehicles.

# Dispersal

A key attribute of the BGM-109G was its high survivability through mobility. In advanced states of readiness, during the transition from peace to war, flights would leave the GAMA, marshal with their dispersal support vehicles, and depart the main operating base. The complete dispersal flight composition is found at Appendix F. Normally, the flight traveled in two cells, with two TELS and one LCC in each. This gave each cell an independent launch capability. In the event launch crews in the LCCs received an emergency action message directing employment of one or more missiles during this "road march," each cell would proceed to the nearest preselected enroute launch point, hastily emplace, and execute launch.

Upon arrival at a preselected and surveyed dispersal site (that was never used in peacetime), a more orderly defensive position and emplacement was possible, to include camouflage netting over the lowered TELs and LCCs. Continual security and alert duty was performed. Each flight remained dependent on the main operating base for resupply and other logistical support, but could act as an independent unit in the event the base was destroyed. The

flight was programmed to relocate to new dispersal sites periodically until all missiles were expended or directed to return to the main operating base. Training for this dispersal mission was the most rigorous and challenging aspect of peacetime operations. This training was conducted at selected field training ranges in the host country, which were obtained through bilateral negotiations.

# Operational History

Initial plans for Intermediate Nuclear Forces modernization called for the deployment of 464 BGM-109Gs (29 flights) and 108 "Pershing IIs." All 108 Army "Pershing IIs" were deployed in Germany at Neu Ulm and Schwabish Gemund. Five nations agreed to host the BGM-109G: The United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, Belgium, and The Netherlands. Although the first unit to reach initial operational capability was in the UK (501st TMW), Italy was the first of the five to agree to host cruise missiles. Deployment was frozen on 9 Dec 87 at 304 missiles (19 flights), when President Reagan and President Gorbachev concluded the INF Treaty in Washington. Appendix C shows the individual Air Force units, their locations, and planned/actual deployments of the BGM-109G.

When GLCM was in development, initial plans were made for a possible deployment to the Pacific in Korea. Although one advance planner was assigned to Headquarters, Pacific Air Forces, all plans of this nature were canceled early in the process.

The 868th Tactical Missile Training Group at Davis-Monthan

AFB AZ served as Tactical Air Command's "schoolhouse" for personnel assigned to GLCM prior to transfer overseas. Here personnel were

trained in GLCM unique ground combat skills prior to reporting to their operational units in theater.

# Phase Out

The INF Treaty was ratified in June, 1988 by the US Senate. Under the provisions of the treaty, all GLCMs and their launchers were to be destroyed within three years (June, 1991), except for several as static display museum pieces. This has been completed. Warheads and LCCs were not restricted by the treaty provisions. In addition, former GLCM bases are subject to inspection for up to 13 years from the time the INF Treaty entered into force. All bases remain within this inspection window to this date.

# Contributions to Deterrence

The deep commitment of the US and NATO Allies to the GLCM (and "Pershing II") deployments were instrumental in bringing the Soviets to the negotiating table. With the INF Treaty, this class of missiles/nuclear weapons has been eliminated. This treaty was the first in arms control efforts to have built in verification and inspection provisions. It also became the framework for even broader arms control initiatives such as the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (START) and Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty.

While the BGM-109G was deployed, it provided a highly mobile, and therefore survivable nuclear deterrent capability, attained through a sound concept of operations. These missiles allowed theater commanders more flexibility and were able to free up more dual capable aircraft for conventional missions. While US Air Force crews manned GLCM LCCs, these (and "Pershing II") missiles

were placed under NATO command and control. It was also an extremely cost effective deterrent, since the missiles were never fired, or even "run up" as in the case of the old "Matador." Concurrently, it capitalized on the significant breakthroughs associated with modern cruise missile technology. Finally, it sent an extremely strong and visible political signal to our allies and adversaries alike. Its deployment in five NATO nations bolstered Alliance solidarity, despite growing antinuclear movement in the mid and late 1980s.

### POSTSCRIPT

# Conclusions

The overview to this work indicated that neither the TM-61 nor TM-76 weapon systems incorporated the proper technology and concepts of operation to make them truly effective weapon systems. Although the BGM-109G incorporated both, it has now been retired as a result of arms control agreements. This final section will compare and contrast the key areas. For purposes of this comparison, the "Matador" and "Mace" (M/M) will be considered as one.

# Technology

- Size: M/M were in the truest sense of the word pilotless airplanes. Their size was that of a small jet, and their engines were short life versions of those used in contemporary fighters and trainers. Nuclear warheads of the period were also bulky. Although launched from a zero-length launcher, their size tied with a predictable flight plan threatened post launch survivability. Technological improvements in the BGM-109G in warhead, engine, and guidance set size allowed the missile to be built much smaller and consequently present a greatly reduced radar cross section.
- Components: Partially due to size, "some assembly required" definitely hindered the M/M concept of operations. Assembly of major components prior to launch extended launch preparation time to what would be unacceptable levels today. The components themselves were relatively fragile, which hindered reliability. Their size hindered mobility. The BGM-109G was completely self contained in its All-Up-Round configuration. No component assembly

was required, and even during routine base level maintenance, the missile would never have to be completely removed from its canister.

- Guidance: The M/M navigation systems were the single greatest limitation to success. Though innovative, they were generally categorized as unreliable, inaccurate, range-limiting, and subject to jamming. The superb TERCOM system in the BGM-109G eliminated all these problems.
- Support Equipment: Technology also hindered the effectiveness of M/M support equipment. The number of support vehicles required to effect launch ranged from 28 in the TM-61 to only two in the BGM-109G. Of note, the unique "Teracruzer" prime mover with its paletized mission cargo was an innovative improvement used in the TM-76A system.

# Concept of Operations

- Unmanned Aspects: As noted earlier in this work, senior Air Force leaders have been traditionally concerned primarily with manned aircraft. As an understandable side effect, GLCMs have historically received only secondary importance. Despite the many advantages offered by cruise missiles, they drew both manpower and money away from Air Force "bread and butter" the manned aircraft. Consequently the ingrained resistance to these systems must be frankly realized when studying their role in US Air Force service.
- Doctrine: The Air Force never developed any consistent GLCM doctrine. A comparison of V-1, M/M, and BGM-109G operations shows only the most rudimentary similarity. Technology again was largely

esponsible. There were significant technological "leaps" between ach system. Serious prelaunch survivability concerns inherent n the V-l concept of operations effectively ruled out application o M/M. Changes and improvements in M/M give the distinct impression f adaptation and innovation rather than concerted research and evelopment. While assigned as an operations planner for the GM-109G, this author knows of no attempt to review M/M concepts or possible application to "Gryphon."

Mobility: Mobility was not a consideration for the V-l and only goal for M/M. Technological limitations gave only a "movable" apability to these systems, and with it only marginal improvements n prelaunch survivability. The BGM-l09G was the only true mobile LCM and its high prelaunch survivability was a key aspect of ts deterrent value.

This comparison has shown that GLCM technology and concepts were inseparably intertwined and mutually influential towards contributing to nuclear deterrence. It appears we will never see missiles of this type deployed again; they accomplished their dission. But it is important to record and assess their historical significance and their roles in US national security. This point was unintentionally driven home during research on this work, when the author contacted General Dynamics concerning information about the BGM-109G. The return mail included only a photograph with a short note that read in part, "Sorry, but this (the photo) is all we have left in our files. I couldn't even locate a prochure."

# APPENDIX A

# SPECIFICATION: Martin "Matador"

Designations: XB-61, B-61, TM-61A/C, MGM-1.

# )imensions:

Length: 39 ft 7 inWing Span: 27 ft 9 inDiameter: 4 ft 6 in

Weight: 12,000 pounds

### Performance:

- Speed: Mach 0.9 (650 mph); over Mach 1 in terminal dive
- Range: 700 miles
- Ceiling: 35,000 feet
- CEP: best 2700 feet

# Propulsion:

- Sustainer: One Allison J33-A-37 Turbojet producing 4600 pounds
- Booster: One Aerojet General solid fuel rocket motor producing 55,000 pounds of thrust for two seconds

# Guidance:

- "Matador A": Radar directed radio command guidance system (MARC/MSQ)
- "Matador C": MSQ and SHANICLE

Warhead: Conventional or single W-5 fission nuclear warhead of 40 to 50 kiloton yield

Prime Contractor: Martin Aircraft (now Martin Marietta)

Number of Missiles: 1200 total produced

- 100 "Matador A" deployed to Europe
- ? "Matador A" deployed to Formosa
- 150 "Matador C" deployed to Europe
- 60 "Matador C" deployed to South Korea

# **Key Milestones:**

- "Matador" project initiated in August, 1945
- First USAF TM-61A launched in March, 1953
- First USAF TM-61C launched in Jaunuary, 1956

Source: Reference 10, page 148.

### · APPENDIX B

### TM-61 LAUNCH ACTIVITIES

Training launches for the "Matador" involved transfer to e zero-length launcher, assembly, and testing in order to be ady for firing within 90 minutes. Although operational launches uld differ somewhat in both time and procedures, the major sks involved are described below:

- Launch (L)-90 (min): Protective tarpaulins are removed d wings are lowered from their transporter stowage.
- L-80: Cradle is attached to the fuselage. Fuselage transported to the zero-length launcher (Photograph 2) by mobile crane.
- L-70: Wings are lowered into position on the fuselage id servos, ground supply feeds are connected.
- L-60: Nosecone/warhead is brought from the armory on special trolley and winched up the launching ramp into position. Idance equipment is set and checked. See Photograph 3 for illustration of this procedure.
- L-40: The booster is hooked into place and final checkout gins. See Photograph 4 for an illustration of this procedure.
- L-05: The pad is cleared and the missile is raised to is launch angle of 17 degrees.
- L-03: Automatic engine start; power increases from 10% > 25%, then to 60%.
  - L-01: Sustainer engine to 100% power.
- Launch: Booster ignites; remaining umbilicals pull free. ee Photograph 1, depicting a TM-61 launch.

ource: Reference 8, pages 304-305.

notographs courtesy of the USAF Museum, Wright-Patterson AFB, nio.

### APPENDIX C

### ORGANIZATIONAL LINEAGE

Sources: References 10, pages 144-50, and 20, pages 107-109.

# MARTIN SSM/B-61/TM-61/MGM-1 "MATADOR"

# **TESTING**

4802nd Guided Missile Squadron formed at Patrick AFB, Florida for research and development purposes; became the:

6555th Guided Missile Wing (later moved to Cape Canaveral, Florida with operational testing at Holloman AFB, New Mexico).

- 1st Pilotless Bomber Squadron (PBS) (light) formed 1 Oct 51 at Patrick AFB.
- 2nd PBS (light) formed 10 Jan 52.

# "MATADOR A" EUROPEAN DEPLOYMENT

Headquarters, United States Air Forces, Europe.

- Headquarters, 12th Air Force.
  - -- 36th Tactical Fighter Wing (logistic support and operational control) beginning 14 Mar 55.
    - --- lst PBS (TAC) deployed to Bitburg AB GE with 50 missiles, arriving 20 Mar 54. This unit was redesignated the lst Tactical Missile Squadron (TMS) in Jun 55 concurrent with the missile's redesignation as TM-61A.
  - -- 50th Tactical Fighter Wing (logistic support and operational control) beginning 14 Mar 55.
    - --- 2nd PBS (TAC) deployed to Hahn AB GE with 50 missiles, arriving 1 Oct 54. This unit was redesignated the 69th TMS in Jun 55 concurrent with the missile's redesignation as TM-61A.
  - -- Both squadrons were brought under the 7382 Guided Missile Group, formed at Hahn AB on 1 Feb 56, for logistic support and operational control, relieving the 36th and 50th TFWs.

(Note: "Matador A" completely phased out of Europe by May, 1957.)

# "MATADOR A" PACIFIC DEPLOYMENT

- The 17th TMS on Taiwan (Formosa) was the first TM-61A missile unit deploy in Asia. Numbers deployed, operating locations, and operational history for this unit are unknown.

# "MATADOR C" EUROPEAN DEPLOYMENT

Headquarters, United States Air Forces, Europe.

- Headquarters, 12th Air Force.
  - -- 701st Tactical Missile Wing (TMW); unit redesignated 38th TMW on 18 Jun 58, based at Hahn AB.
    - --- 585th Tactical Missile Group (TMG) at Bitburg AB GE, formed 15 Sep 56.
      - --- lst TMS and supporting squadrons equipped with "Matador C" by Feb 57.
    - --- 586th TMG at Hahn AB.
      - --- 69th TMS and supporting squadrons equipped with "Matador C" by Feb 57.
    - --- 587th TMW at Sembach AB GE.
      - --- 11th TMS and supporting squadrons deployed with 50 "Matador C" missiles from the outset; unit formed 1 Jul 56, arriving in Europe during 1957.

In Jun 58, the following squadron redesignations occurred:

- The 1st TMS at Bitburg became the 71st TMS.
- The 69th TMS at Hahn became the 405th TMS.
- The 11th TMS at Sembach became the 822nd TMS.

(Note: "Matador C" completely phased out of Europe by 1 Apr 60.)

# "MATADOR C" PACIFIC DEPLOYMENT

- 314th Air Division, Osan AB, Korea.
  - -- 58th TMG (588th TMG until 1 Oct 58), Osan AB, with 60 missiles in 1958.
    - --- Flight 1 (20 missiles), Osan AB.
    - --- Flight 2 (20 missiles), Kimpo Airport (Seoul).
    - --- Flight 3 (20 missiles), Chinchon Ni.
- (Note 1: "Matador C" completely phased out of S. Korea by 1962.)
- (Note 2: Reference Map 2 for S. Korean TM-61C bases.)

### ORGANIZATIONAL LINEAGE (Cont.)

# MARTIN TM-61B/TM-76/MGM-13/CGM-13 "MACE"

# "MACE A" EUROPEAN DEPLOYMENT

Headquarters, 12th Air Force.

- 38 TMW.
  - -- 585th TMG.
    - --- The 71st TMS at Bitburg AB GE would never receive "Mace A." They were ordered to retain the "Matador C" due to delays in replacing all-weather aircraft capability with the F-105. This unit would transition directly to "Mace B."
  - -- 586th TMG.
    - --- The 405th TMS at Hahn AB GE with 50 missiles.
  - -- 587 TMG.
    - --- The 822nd TMS at Sembach AB GE with 50 missiles.
- By September, 1962, three additional 38th TMW squadrons were added to the existing force, with 50 missiles each, bringing the total to 250 "Mace A" missiles.
  - -- The 89th TMS at Hahn AB GE.
  - -- The 823rd and 887th TMS' at Sembach AB GE.

(Note: "Mace A" completely phased out of Europe by Sept, 1966.)

"MACE A" PACIFIC DEPLOYMENT - None.

# "MACE B" EUROPEAN DEPLOYMENT

Headquarters, 12th Air Force.

- 38th TMW.
  - -- By September 1965, 50 "Mace B" missiles and their hardened launchers were deployed to the 71 TMS, Bitburg AB GE.
- (Note 1: "Mace B" completely phased out of Europe by 1 May, 1969.)
- (Note 2: Reference Map 1 for German TM-61 and TM-76 bases.)

# "MACE B" PACIFIC DEPLOYMENT

Headquarters, Fifth Air Force.

- 313th Air Division, Kadena AB, Japan.
  - -- 498th TMG (591st TMG prior designation) activated on 8 Feb 61 and deployed to Okinawa, Japan with 60 missiles.
    - --- 873 TMS, Bishagawa Billeting Annex.
      - --- Bolo Point Auxiliary Airfield (two tactical missile flights 20 missiles).
      - ---- Motobu Quarry (one TMF 10 missiles).
      - ---- Motobu Army Airfield (one TMF 10 missiles).
      - --- Camp Hansen Easely Range (two TMF 20 missiles).
- (Note 1: "Mace B" completely phased out of Japan during 1970-71.)
- (Note 2: Reference Map 3 for TM-76B operating locations on Okinawa.)

# ORGANIZATIONAL LINEAGE (Cont.)

# GENERAL DYNAMICS BGM-109G "GRYPHON"

Headquarters, United States Air Forces in Europe

- Headquarters, Third Air Force, RAF Mildenhall UK
  - -- Wing 1: 501st TMW, RAF Greenham Common UK
    - --- IOC: Dec 83
    - --- Number flights projected/deployed: 6/6
    - --- Number missiles projected/deployed: 96/96
  - -- Wing 5: 303rd (ex-550th) TMW, RAF Molesworth UK
    - --- IOC: Dec 87
    - --- Number flights projected/deployed: 4/1
    - --- Number missiles projected/deployed: 64/16
- Headquarters, 16th Air Force, Torrejon AB SP
  - -- Wing 2: 487th TMW, Comiso AS IT (Sicily)
    - --- IOC: Mar 84
    - --- Number flights projected/deployed: 7/7
    - --- Number missiles projected/deployed: 112/112
- Headquarters, 17th Air Force, Sembach AB GE
  - -- Wing 3: 485th TMW, Florennes AB BE
    - --- IOC: Mar 85
    - --- Number flights projected/deployed: 3/1
    - --- Number missiles projected/deployed: 48/16
  - -- Wing 4: 38th TMW, Wueschheim AS GE
    - --- IOC: Mar 86
    - --- Number flights projected/deployed: 6/4
    - --- Number missiles projected/deployed: 96/64
  - -- Wing 6: 486th TMW. Woensdrecht AB NL
    - --- IOC: N/A
    - --- Number flights projected/deployed: 3/0
    - --- Number missiles projected/deployed: 48/0

# TOTALS

	Projected	Deployed
Flights	29	19
Missiles	464	288

(Note: Reference Map 4 for BGM-109G operating locations.)

### APPENDIX D

### SPECIFICATION: Martin "Mace"

Designations: TM-61B, TM-76A/B, MGM-13A/B, MQM-13B (target drone)

### Dimensions:

- Length: 44 feet 2 inches
- Wing Span: 22 feet 1 inches
- Diameter: 4 feet 6 inches

Weight: 13,000 pounds

### Performance:

- Speed: Mach 2.8

- Range:

-- "Mace A": 800 miles -- "Mace B": 1500 miles Ceiling: Over 40,000 feet

# Propulsion:

pounds of thrust

Sustainer: One Allison J33-A-41 turbojet engine producing
5,200 pounds of thrust
Booster: One Thiokol solid rocket motor producing 50,000

# Guidance:

- "Mace A": Goodyear Automatic Terrain Recognition and Navigation (ATRAN) system
- "Mace B": AC Spark Plug "AChiever" inertial guidance system

Warhead: One conventional or W-28 fusion nuclear warhead of 2 megaton yield

Prime Contractor: Martin Aircraft (now Martin Marietta)

Number of Missiles: Over 1000 produced

- 250 "Mace A" deployed to Europe
- 50 "Mace B" deployed to Europe
- 60 "Mace B" deployed to Okinawa, Japan

# **Key Development Dates:**

- First YTM-76A flown on 12 Oct 55.
- Production began in May, 1958.
- First TM-76A deployed in April, 1959.
- First TM-76B deployed in September, 1961.

Source: Reference 10, page 148.

### APPENDIX E

# SPECIFICATION: General Dynamics "GRYPHON"

Designation: BGM-109G (Boosted Guided Missile)

### Dimensions:

- Length: 18 feet 2 inches; with booster, 20 feet 6 inches
- Wing span: 8 feet 7 inches (wings extended)
- Diameter: 1 foot 9 inches

# Weights:

- Missile alone: 2,650 pounds
- Missile with booster: 3,200 pounds

### Performance:

- Speed: Approximately 500 mph
- Range: 1500 miles
- Ceiling: 10 to 500 feet - Warhead CEP: 100 feet

# Propulsion:

- Sustainer: One Williams International F-107-WR-102 turbofan producing 600 pounds of thrust
- Booster: One solid fuel rocket motor producing 7000 pounds of thrust

Guidance: Inertial system with McDonnell Douglas Terrain Contour Matching (TERCOM) updates at selected intervals

Warhead: One W-84 fusion warhead of 80 kilotons yield

Prime Contractor: General Dynamics

### Number of Missiles:

- 464 planned for deployment in Europe
- 288 actually deployed in five European countries

Source: Reference 10, page 150.

### APPENDIX F

# "GRYPHON" FLIGHT COMPOSITION (Typical)

### Personnel: 70

- Flight Commander (1)
- Assistant Flight Commander (1)
- Launch Control Officers (4) (two per LCC)
- Maintenance personnel (19) (all enlisted)
  - Security Police (44)
    - -- At UK bases, 1/3 of security police were RAF Regiment
    - -- At Comiso, 1/3 of security police were Italian Caribinari
- Medic (1)

### Vehicles: 19

- Transporter Erector Launchers (TEL) (4)
  - -- Four missiles in All-Up-Round configuration per TEL
- Launch Control Center (LCC) (2)
- Wrecker (1)
- Security Police vehicles (10)
- Supply vehicles (5)


### Notes:

Normally GLCM convoys traveled in two cells. Each cell had two TELs and one LCC, so each retained an independent launch capability.


TELs, LCCs, and the Wrecker used the German M.A.N (Maschinenfabrick Augsburg - Nuremburg) prime mover. The US Army's "Pershing II" used the same prime mover.

Several security and supply vehicles towed water buffaloes or cargo trailers.


MAP 1
GERMAN TM-61 AND TM-76 BASES



MAP 2
SOUTH KOREAN TM-61C BASES




MAP 3
TM-76B BASES ON OKINAWA




MAP 4

# BGM-109G BASES IN USAFE LEGEND RAF Greenham Common UK A. B. Comiso Air Station IT C. Florennes Air Base BE Weuschheim Air Station GE D. E. RAF Molesworth UK F. Woensdrecht Air Base NL **ICELAND** 5 = = NORWAY FINLAND SWEDEN<sup>1</sup> RUSSIA 2000 North See · E & 1. **BYELARUS** KINGDOM £∂. 0' È scav YUGOSLAVIA Sea iorra. terrorear Sea ALGERIA MOROCCO 500 Nitomet 500 Nautocal M 801970 (801266) 2-92

FIGURE 1
MARTIN TM-61 "MATADOR"








FIGURE 3

# TYPICAL SHANICLE FLIGHT PATTERN






FIGURE 5

MARTIN TM-76B "MACE"







- 64 -


FIGURE 7


GROUND LAUNCHED CRUISE MISSILE - BGM-109G




# Transporter-Erector-Launcher (TEL)



















11/4 Ce 11111/40

MACE: Tactical surface-to-surface quided missile fired from a hardened site.

PHOTOGRAPH 8

TM-76B LAUNCH FROM HARDENED SHELTER

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### GLOSSARY

AB Air Base

ALCM Air Launched Cruise Missile

ATRAN Automatic Terrain Recognition & Navigation

AUR All-Up-Round (BGM-109G)

BGM Boosted Guided Missile (as in BGM-109G)

CEP Circular Error Probable (warhead accuracy)

CFE Conventional Forces in Europe (Treaty)

GAMA GLCM Alert & Maintenance Area (BGM-109G)

GLCM Ground Launched Cruise Missile

INF Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces (Treaty)

IOC Initial Operational Capability

ITCP Initial Timing Control Point (BGM-109G)

LBS Abbreviation for Pounds

LCC Launch Control Center (BGM-109G)

MARC/MSQ Manual Airborne Radio Control (TM-61A)

MM-1 Military Model One ("Mace" Teracruzer)

MPH Miles Per Hour

PBS Pilotless Bomber Squadron

ORA Quick Reaction Alert

RATO Rocket Assisted Take Off (booster)

RFML Rapid Fire Multiple Launch (TM-76A)

RSS Ready Storage Structure (BGM-109G)

SHANICLE Short Range Navigation Vehicle (TM-61C)

SSM Surface-to-Surface Missile

START Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

## **GLOSSARY**

(Cont.)

TAC Tactical Air Command

TAWC Tactical Air Warfare Center (Eglin AFB)

TEL Transporter-Erector-Launcher (BGM-109G)

TERCOM Terrain Contour Matching (BGM-109G)

TM Tactical Missile (as in TM-61 & TM-76)

TMG Tactical Missile Group

TMS Tactical Missile Squadron

TMW Tactical Missile Wing

USAF United States Air Force

USAFE United States Air Forces in Europe

Vergeltungswaffe German for "Vengeance Weapon" (V-1)

ZEL Zero Length Launcher (TM-61)